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NEWS AND THE DOLLAR/YEN EXCHANGE RATE, 1931-1933:
THE END OF THE GOLD STANDARD, IMPERIALISM, AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION
ABSTRACT
According to the efficient market hypothesis, news in Tokyo is
responsible for the exchange rate changes during the Tokyo market hours,
while the U.S. news is responsible for changes in the New York hours. The
intra-daily dynamics of the $/yen exchange rate from December 1931 to
November 1933 is analyzed. Japan's decision to go off gold in December 1931
depreciated yen by 30% in a month, mostly in the Tokyo market. During 1932,
the yen depreciated another 30%, mainly due to Japan's aggression in China
and resulting diplomatic isolation. In 1933, the yen appreciated against
the dollar, mainly in the New York market, due to the U.S. decision togo
off gold.However, exchange rate volatility and its sensitivity to news
declined over the two year period, because of increasing capital controls.
Changes in the interest rate differential was found insignificant for the
changes in the exchange rate. Political regime changes, such as a decision
to go off gold, most influenced the exchange rate for the period considered.
There were no policy decisions by Japan to cause yen depreciation to promote
export and limit import in 1931-33.
Takatoshi Ito Kunjo Okina
Department of Economics Bank Of Japan
Univeristy of Minnesota Tokyo, Japan
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Juro Teranishj
Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashj University
Kunitachi, Tokyo, Japan1.Introduction
This paper considers the news and its effects on the dollar/yen
exchange rate from December 1931 to November 1933. The intra-daily data,
i.e. ,theTokyo and New York quotes of the day, are analyzed for the two
year period, so that sources of the rapid exchange rate change can be better
identified.
The investigation of exchange rate dynamics during this period is
important for at least three reasons. First, it was the time that the
exchange rate moved most for a short period of time. By identifying the
factors affecting rapid depreciation, we gain insights into determinants of
the exchange rate during the interwar period. Second, by analyzing the
intra-daily data, it is possible to infer how efficient the international
financial markets were during the interwar period. Third, the rapidyen
depreciation in this period is often credited for the fast recovery of the
Japanese economy after the depression of 1929-31. It is interesting to
investigate whether the depreciation was planned for the concurrent and
subsequent export drive or it was a result of market force.
In order to accomplish the objectives a news (event) analysis is
employed. If the market is efficient, relevant news is reflected in the
asset price, or the exchange rate in this case, within minutes of its
revelation.It is also reasonable to assume, at least for the first
approximation, that relevant news concerning the economic and political
events in Japan are revealed during the Japanese market hours, and those in
the U.S. are revealed during the U.S. market hours. Because of the time
difference between Tokyo and New York, business hours of the two markets do
not overlap. By recording the closing quotes of the two markets in the same
day,it is possible to identify which market was more responsible for the
1exchange rate changes, and hence to infer the origin of thenews relevant to
the changes. This method has been successfullyemployed for the period from
1980 to 1985 by Ito and Roley (1986), and fora one-year period after the
Group of Five Plaza Agreement by Ito (1987). Including thesestudies, there
have been many studies of exchange rate dynamics after1973, but this paper
is a first attempt, to the best of ourknowledge, that investigate the
dynamics of the intra-daily exchange rate during thefloating exchange rate
regime of the interwar period.
2. Background
From 1874 to1897, the yen depreciate from about $100/100yen to
$50/100 yen. The yen was on the gold standard from 1897to 1917.During
the l920s, many European countries restored thegold standard, and Japan
attempted to restore the gold standard.These countries restored (or
attempted to restore) the exchange rate at the "prewar(old) parity," the
rate prevailing before the First World War."1"This is one of the reasons
that European countries andJapan experienced a decade of stagnant,
deflationary economy. (See Figure 1 for thedollar/yen exchange rate up to
the Second World War.)
Insert FIGURE 1 about here
In Japan, the Great KantoEarthquake of September 1923 and the
F-inancjal Panic of March 1927were also marks of the troubled l920s. In
July 1929, Junnosuke Inouye became the FinanceMinister of the Hamaguchi
cabinet.He introduced a deflationary policy in orderto restore the gold
standard for the yen, a stated goal of thecabinet. There was no bond
financing for the general budget of 1930, for thefirst time since 1907.
2The central government expenditure decreased by 10.2 percent from 1929to
1930, and decreased 5.2 percent from 1930 to 1931. The gold standard of
yen, which was called "the resumption of gold export" in Japan, was restored
in January 11, 1930. The value of yen had risen from $43/l0O yen before the
announcement of intention to restore the gold standard in 1929 to $49/100
yen in December 1929.
In addition to the deflationary policies, other external events, such
as the agricultural crisis of 1930, and the decline in export to the U.S.
following the U.S. stock market crash of October 1929, worsened the economic
performance of Japan. For a two-year period from 1929 to 1931, the price of
all farm goods declined by 39 percent, the Wholesale Price Index declinedby
30 percent, and real Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation declined by 12
percent.At the same time, the real GNP stalled (to be precise, increased
by 1.5 percent in two years) and real export increased by only 6.7 percent
over the two years. However, the economic situation from 1929 to 1931 in
Japan was much better than the United States, where real income dropped by
19 percent for the same period (and was still on itsway down), and it was
much worse in the 1921-23 recession in Japan when the real GNP dropped by 7
percent.
On September 21, 1931, British sterling went off gold, and the pound
immediately depreciated. Many European countries followed suit:Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland left the gold standard within a week after
Britain's decision, as did Finland in October. In September 1931, Japan
started to invade Manchuria. These events created strong pressure to invest
in U.S. dollars. The Yokohama Shokin Bank, the predecessor of the Bank of
Tokyo and the official bank for foreign exchange, met all the buy orders of
dollars by taking sell positions. However, in order to settle the position,
3the bank later needed transport species abroad. At theend of 1929, shortly
before the return to the gold standard, theamount of gold reserves in the
Bank of Japan was 1,072 millionyen. By the end of 1931, shortly after the
gold embargo, the gold reserve was reduced to 470 millionyen, less than
half of the level two years earlier. (Bank ofJapan (1985, p.71).)
Japan decided to go off gold on December 13, l93l/'2The yen
depreciated about 30 percent within a month and about 60percent in a year.
This is one of the most dramatic changes in theyen/dollar exchange rate in
the market/3 Although one of thereasons for the rapid depreciation was
an adjustment from the overvalued parity during thegold standard, other
reasons may have contributed to depreciation,especially after the initial
phase of the exchange rate adjustment.Japan launched a military assault on
mainland China, and was condemned in theLeague of Nations.The Great
Depression of the United States wasgetting worse, and the United States
went off the gold standard in 1933. Thispaper will carefully considerd
these various events and willquantify their effects on the changes in the
exchange rate.
The depreciation ofyen, along with the fiscal and monetary stimulus,
is often credited for the fast
recovery of the Japanese economy from 1931 to
1933/ though the effect of the yen depreciation of 1931-1932on the
Japanese recovery is an interestingtopic of investigation, it is beyond the
scope of this paper. (For European economies,see Eighengreen and Sachs
(1985) for the effect of exchangerates on the economic recovery.) Instead,
we will investigate whether theyen depreciation was engineered as a policy
objective or determined in the efficientmarket.
43. Data and Definitions
The closing rate of the exchange rate (in units of dollars per 100 yen)
in the Tokyo and New York markets are collected daily from newspaper, cai
Shogyo Shinpo from December 1, 1931 to November 30, 1933."" The Japanese
Standard Time (JST) is fourteen hours ahead of the Eastcoast Standard Time
(EST).Tokyo is the first major market to open in a day. It opens a few
hours after closing of the New York market of the preceding day. Since
there is no major market or news coming out between the New York closing and
the Tokyo opening, the Tokyo opening canwell approximated by the New
York closing quote. (See Ito and Roley (1987) for the validity of this
claim in the 1980s.) When the Tokyo market closes, the Shanghai and Indian
markets are still open, and the London market opens in a few hours after the
Tokyo market closes.The late afternoon session of the London market
overlaps for a few hours with the morning session of the New York market.
We define the change in the Tokyo market on day t, TOKYO(T) as the
change from the New York close of day T-l, NYDY(T-1), to the Tokyo close,
TKDY(T), and the change in the New York market, NYORK(T), is defined as the
change from the Tokyo close to the New York close of the day.
TOKYO(T) TKDY(T) -NYDY(T-l)
NYORK(T) NYDY(T) -TKDY(T).
Note that in this definition, the New York market includes changes in the
Indian and European markets, too. Whenever the New York market is mentioned
in the rest of this paper, this proviso applies.
For purposes of comparison, the 24-hour change in New York, NYORK24(T),
is also defined and used.
NYORK24(T) —NYDY(T)-NYDY(T-1)
The advantage of having the intra-daily data over the daily data will be
5evident from considering the information contents of the TOKYO and NYORK
decornpsitioncompared with NYORK24.
The call rate in Tokyo, TKR. and the call rate in New York,NYR, are
also collected from the same source. The interest differential betweenthe
two countries is defined as,
INTDIF(T)NYR(T)-TKR(T).
If capital flows attracted by the interest rate differentialwere a
major determinant of the exchange rate changes in the i930s, like thecase
in the l980s, then the interest rate differential shouldexplain the
exchange rate changes. This conjecture will be tested in section 8.
The daily exchange rate (the New York quote) from December1931 to
November 1933 is plotted in Figure 2, and thesummary statistics including
the decomposed market changes are shown in Table 1.
Insert Figure 2a, 2b and Table I about here
Observe, first, that a rapid change in the exchange ratecame in various
waves (regimes), A wave of rapid changes was followed by arelatively calm
period before another wave of changes. This pattern iscommon to the post
Bretton Woods experiences.6 Theoretically,a regime of yen depreciation
(or appreciation) should correspond to a bunch ofnews relevant to the
exchange rate determinations Second, the yen depreciated by about $30/100
yen in one year following the gold embargo, and then stabilized around
$2l/lOOyen for several months. After the U.S. went offgold, the yen slowly
appreciated by $10/laO yen in several months. Thus, in netover the two
year period, the yen depreciated by $19/lao yen. Clearly, a different force
on the value of yen appeared in 1933. Third, thegeographical source of
6major disturbances shifted from Asia to the United States over the two years
of our sample. The standard deviation in the Tokyo market was larger than
in the New York market for one year following the Japanese gold embargo.
However, from December 1932 to November 1933, the volatility of the New York
market exceeded that of the Tokyo market.
As indicated in figures, various regimes are identified over the two
year period. In most cases, when. a regime started and ended is clearcut/7''
Table 2 is a statistical summary of changes in the dollar/yen exchange rate
for each regime. In the following sections, each regime will be examined
closely.
Insert Table 2 about here
4. Regime I: Takahashi's Decision to Go Off the Gold Standard
In the three weeks starting on December 11, 1931 (Regime 1), the yen
depreciated by about 30 percent. In fact, there were two phases in this
regime. First, the drop occurred immediately before and after December 13,
the day the yen went off gold. Second, the yen depreciated for three days
starting December 27 apparently with no significant news.
When the cabinet collapsed on December 11 citing the "incompatibility"
within the cabinet, there was widespread anticipation that the yen would go
off gold.On that day, the leading business newspaper began a serial of
articles about what would happen to the economy if gold exports were
suspended, and the market was reasonably certain that this would occur.
However, there was great uncertainty about the political future and trading
on the Tokyo exchange virtually came to a standstill.On December 12,
another large drop in quotes in the Tokyo market was recorded. We may
conclude that a drop in the value of yen from $48 to $40 over ten days from
7December 11 was a direct reaction to the (anticipations of) agold embargo.
The source of disturbances was clearly in the Tokyo market andso was
revealed by statistics. In fact, most of the drop of the yen occurred
before the forthcoming announcement of the gold embargo. This isevidence
in support of the view that markets were efficient andexpectations were
rational in the beginning of the 1930s.
Another drop of $5/100 yen at the end of the monthwas caused with no
new information. It is not obvious why the yen depreciated on December 28
(in Tokyo) and on December 29 (in New York). Thedrop on December 28,
according to newspapers, was due to speculations. For example, due to the
anticipated decline in the yen, importers of (raw) cotton hastened thedeal
(i.e., a classical case of leads). Thenewspaper on December 30,1931
carried an article written in New York about thedrop on December 29 in the
New York market which said that "Bankers and financialexperts cannot find
particular causes for the crash of the yen." Since thereare instances in
which large movements in the exchange ratecannot be associated with
significant news events even in the 1980s, it is notsurprising to find an
episode of a speculative attack in the 1930s.
5 Adventures in Imperialism and the Yen'sDepreciation in Early 1932
During the first month and a half of 1932 (Regime Q-I), theforeign
exchange market was volatile, although the depreciation,which mainly
happened in Tokyo, and appreciation, whichmainly happened in New York,
cancelled each other out. In February andJune, there were waves of yen
depreciation, which were results of Japan'saggressions in China, which drew
criticism from the rest of the world.
Although Japanese imperialism started earlier, itsspeed of aggression
8accelerated during the year of 1932, In January and February, Japan
attacked Shianghai.In March, Manchuria became "independent" with a
government many western nations regarded as a puppet of the Japanese
military.When these conflicts developed, the yen depreciated. In
particular, a sharp decline on January 29 was a response to the Japanese
attack on Shianghai on January 28. These aggressions took place during the
Tokyo market hours, thus causing a yen depreciation in the Tokyo market. In
a few instances, signs of truce caused the yen to appreciate (for example,
on February 29 and March 10).
In January, depreciation occurred in the Tokyo market, responding to
the news of the attack on Shianghai combined with the fear of losing the
Chinese market for export. However, the depreciation was countered by
appreciation in the New York market. The news of the Japanese aggression
might not have been taken seriously enough in New York, and the dollar was
weakening with the news of the troubled U.S. economy (to be discussed in
detail shortly).
From the middle to the end of February, the yen depreciated by $4/lOO
yen (Regime II).This reflects the reaction of foreign investors to
increasing political criticism of the Japanese activities in Shianghai and
Manchuria. On February 16, the League of Nations adopted an appeal to Japan
on the issue of the Shianghai incidents, and a fact-finding mission was
dispatched by the League of Nations, arriving at Japan on February 29. Most
yen depreciation this time occurred in the New York market.This is
evidence that foreign governments' reaction to the Japanese military
adventures were the key to the yen depreciation. Let us elaborate on this
conclusion.
9Newspapers reported that major sellers of yen against dollars (in New
York) were American banks, while the Japanese banks sold dollars for profit-
taking, although the pressure of selling yen dominated buying yen.(Chugai
Shogyo Sinpo, February 26, 1932.) It was also reported that the loss of
reputation made it difficult for Japan to issue, or rollover, the dollar-
denominated bonds issued abroad.It seemed that American investors were
more informed about the determination of the U.S. government to penalize
Japan for her military adventures in China.
In the U.S., the Great Depression was in progress.New York stock
prices lost 40-50 percent of their value in the first half of the year. The
government countered with measures to inflate the money supply. The fear of
possible inflation caused the European investors to pull their investments
from the United States. The net flow of gold out of the U.S. amounted to
623 million dollars, making the balance at the end of June at 3.92 billion
dollars. This large outflow of gold prompted rumors of the gold embargoby
the U.S., for example, on March 29, and depreciated the dollar againstyen.
However, these events were dominated by the yen depreciation news mentioned
above.
The Japanese political instability in the 1930s was twofold.As
mentioned above, international criticism of Japanese aggressions in China
was a great factor in yen depreciation. However, there were other domestic
disturbances in Japan.There were several political assassinations in
Japan. On February 9, ex-Finance Minister Inouye was assassinated; on March
5, Mituj Zajbatsu executive Takuma Dan was assassinated; and onMay 15,
Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated. However, the domesticpolitical
instability did not cause an immediate sharp change in the value ofyen.
The exchange rate did not showany significant movement on February 9 or 10,
10and the assassination of the Prime Minister caused a yen depreciation of
only a small amount (less than by $1) temporarily on May 16.
New Prime Minister Saito formed an all-party coalition government on
May 26 and called a special parliamentary session from June 1 to June 15.
The special session passed, among others, the Act of Preventing Capital
Flight [Shihon Tohi Boshi HoJ (which became effective on July 1).
However, the parliamentary session was followed by another wave of yen
depreciations (Regime III). This time, according to newspapers, speculators
in Shianghai were to blame, combined with hightened political instability
caused by a conflict at the Manchurian customs office (on June 27).The
drop in yen might also have been hastened by import leads (of cotton) and by
speculations which tried to avoid the capital controls that were soon to be
• /8/
imposed.
In sum,the Japanese yen depreciated due to the U.S. criticisms of
Japanese imperialism. The instability between military aggression and signs
of truce, combined with the uncertainties in the U.S. economic prospects,
caused great volatility, as can be seen in the standard deviations in Table
2, Regimes Q-I, Q-II, and III.
6. Increasing International Conflicts in the Second Half of 1932
During the month f July 1932 (Regime Q-III), the exchange rate market
was rather calm.This was mainly because of the newly enacted capital
controls.Although the law of preventing capital flight would be found
ineffective later, uncertainty about implementing procedures in the first
month under the law made the transaction very thin, resulting in minor
volatility (with standard deviations, less than .20).
In the second half of 1932, there were two waves of yen depreciations,
11one from August 5 to 19 (Regime IV) and another from October 26 to November
29 (Regime V). Yen depreciations in both regimes were mainly caused by
speculations outside Japan.
Since the capital flight prevention act was found to be ineffective as
a means of stopping capital movement, domestic speculations were not
effectively sealed by the new law to prevent capital flight. Investors and
speculators saw the weakening of the yen due to the diplomatic isolation of
Japan, which in turn was caused by increasing criticism from the United
States and other countries of Japan for its handling of Manchuria and
aggression toward China.
TheJapanese activity in Manchuria and in mainland Chinawas
investigated by the League of Nations. A fact-finding mission, which came
to Japan in February and submitted a report in October, was surprisingly (to
the Japanese) critical of Japan. The increasing tensions between Japan and
the western nations prompted foreign speculators to sellyen.It was
considered at the time, "the movement of the yen depends on the foreign
countries' attitude toward Japan." (Chugai Shogyo Shinpo, October 4.)
The speculations occurred outside Japan, as evidenced by a larger share
of yen depreciation in the New York market during regimes IV and V.As
Finance Minister Takahashj defended himself from the growing criticism for
yen depreciation, by saying that "speculations abroad cannot be controlled
[by the Japanese government]." (Chugaj Shogyo Shinpo, August 25, 1932)
7.U.s. Financial Crisis, FDR's New Deal, and the Dollar Off Gold
The dollar/yen exchange rate changes in 1933 were dominated by the
U.S. -oriented news. The yen appreciation was evident in the New York market
rather than in the Tokyo market, becuase the dollar wasdepreciating (not
12only against yen but also against sterling) in response to the U.S. news.
The financial crisis in March 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the
decision to move dollars off the gold standard, and the increase in the
purchase price of gold contributed to the dollar depreciation throughout
1933. Let us consider in detail exactly how each event corresponds to the
dollar depreciation (yen appreciation).
After being criticized for its military activities in China and
Manchuria, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in March 1933. Japan
became gradually, but steadily, isolated in the international political
circles.
From December 1932 to mid April 1933 (Regime Q-V), the dollar/yen
exchange rate was rather stable. Although the yen had started to appreciate
from a low of $20 recorded in November 1932, the process was very slow. The
stability in the $/yen level was rather surprising in light of many events
which we would consider fundamental to the determination of the exchange
rate.In the spring of 1933, a financial crisis developed in the United
States. On February 14, a bank moratorium was imposed in Michigan, followed
by other states. On March 3, New York and Illinois declared moratoria. By
this time, moratorium had spread to 38 states and operations and withdrawal
were limited in 10 other states and the District of Columbia. On March 4,
Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated and new policies and directives were
issued immediately.The nationwide bank moratorium, the suspention of
convertibility, and the gold embargo was announced on March 5.The
financial market, including the exchange market was closed from March 4 to
March 12. When the market was reopened on March 13, strict capital controls
were imposed to prevent capital flight and speculation. The gold export was
restored with a licensing system (effective on March 10). It was not until
13April 19 that the dollar went off gold.
The interest rate was raised sharply when the moratorium was lifted.
The New York Federal Reserve Bank raised the discount rate to 3.5 percent,
and the call rate jumped to 5 percent. The quotes of the dollar/yen rate
were not available in the Tokyo market during the period of moratorium. The
Japanese finaicial market was unaffected by the sharp increase in the call
rate in the United States.
It is puzzling from the viewpoint of the efficient market hypothesis
that the dollar did not depreciate (so that the yen against the dollar did
not appreciate) in March, when it became obvious from various news stories
that the dollar was going to be off gold soon. It is possible that resuming
gold export, though licenses were needed, was enough to reassure the market.
It may also have been the case that capital controls in Japan were strict
andeffective, sothat the speculations couldnottakeplace.
Alternatively, the appreciation pressure from widening the interest rate
spread was just enough to cancel the depreciation pressure from an increased
probability of going off gold permanently.
In the beginning of April, applications for gold export increased
sharply. President Roosevelt announced the gold embargo on April 19. The
dollar depreciation from April 19 to April 25 (Regime VI) was solely caused
by the decision by the United States to go off gold. Most depreciation took
place in the New York market, and the volatility in the New York market was
very large. The interest rate was stable at 0.725 percent in Tokyo and 1.0
percent during this period. The stability of the interest rates with the
exchange rate changes contrasts the March episode described above.
14From the end of April to the beginning of June (Regime Q-VI), the
market was rather quiet. Although the total change was small, there is some
evidence from "market decomposed accumulated changes" that news in the Tokyo
market was causing the yen to depreciate while news in the New York market
was appreciating it.On May 1, 1933, the Foreign Exchange Control Law
became effective. This superceded and strengthened the Law of Preventing
Capital Flight introduced a year earlier. With this new law, the government
was given the authority to control every aspect of foreign exchange.In
fact, Japan tried to stabilize the value of yen with this exchange control
law.When the dollar left the gold standard on April 20, Japan decided to
fix the value of yen to sterling, with a wide band. After April 20, the yen
was between 1 shilling 2 pence and a half and 1 shilling 2 pence and 1/16
for the rest of the year. Therefore, any change in the $/yen value after
April was actually the change in the value of the dollar against sterling
and yen.
From June 3 to July 18 (Regime VII-R), the dollar depreciated by more
than $5/100 yen. At the end of May, the U.S. formally abolished the gold
linkage,settingoffanother depreciation wave. When the U.S.
representative opposed taking measures to stabilize the exchange rate (on
June 28) in the Monetary and Economic Conference in London (June 21 -July
27), and when President Roosevelt further indicated that he would put a
priority on domestic stimulation, another wave of dollar depreciation
resulted.Again, most of the relevant news originated in New York. This
scenario is confirmed by a high mean of depreciation of dollars and high
volatility in the New York market for the VII-R regime.
The yen depreciated from mid-July to the end of July by $3/lOOyen
(Regime VIII). The depreciation was mainly caused in Tokyo market.
15However, no obvious reason for this is found.
From August to the end of October (Regime Q-VIII), the exchange market
was quiet. A strong recovery of the U.S. economy was expected due to the
policy package under the New Deal during the summer of 1933.The stock
price increased by 50% from the bottom recorded in March.However, in
September, it became evident that production and employment rates were not
improving as planned. The performance of the economy disappointed workers
and the number of strikes increased.
On October 22, President Roosevelt announced that thegovernment would
purchase gold at higher prices. A government agency, the Reconstruction
FinanceCorporation,started buying domestically producedgoldat
$3l.36/troy oz. on October 25, and then the price was gradually raised to
$34.06 on December 18. Moreover, the New York Federal ReserveBank was
instructed to purchase gold from abroad. The U.S.bought $12 million of
domestic gold and $5 million of foreign gold.More money would be
circulated, prices would be increased and the production would be increased.
Essentially, this was a deliberate dollar devaluation (depreciation)policy.
These events were responsible for a large depreciation of thedollar
against yen from October 21 to November 21 (Regime IX).The dollar
depreciated against yen by more than $4/yen, about 5% for thisperiod.
Since the major news originated in the New Yorkmarket, the New York market
was responsible for the depreciation of the dollar, and thevolatility of
the New York market far exceeded that of theTokyo market.
168. Interest Rate Effects on the Exchange Rate Determination
In the modern view of the portfolio balance approach, the exchange rate
strongly responds to the interest rate differential. In fact, exchange rate
fluctuations back in 1927 and 1928 were caused by capital flows prompted by
interest rate differentials (Bank of Tokyo (1969)). It is of our interest
to check whether the interest rate differentials between Japan and the
United States was at all relevant to the exchange rate movement from 1931 to
1933. The time series of the differential in the call rates of the U.S. and
Japan is depicted in Figure 3a. The change in the exchange rate is shownin
Figure 3b for comparison. Casual observations of these figures do not
convince us that the interest differential was dominantly responsible for
changes of the exchange rate. In order to rigorously evaluate the effectof
the interest rate differential on the exchange rate, we proceed to test a
particular hypothesis.
Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here
If uncovered interest parity and rational expectations hold, the
interest rate differential between the U.S. and Japan would predict movement
in the dolar/yen exchange rate (for example, see Ito (1988) for arithmetics
of uncovered interest parity). In particular, a higher U.S. interest rate,
according touncovered interest parity implies theexpectedyen
appreciation.If expectations are rational (unbiased), the realized (ex
post) rate is the sum of the expected rate and the random forecast errors.
From this point of view, one may want to regress the change in the realized
future exchange rate, NYDY(t÷1)-NYDY(t), on the interest rate differential,
INTDIF(t) =NYR(t)-TKR(t).We expect the positive sign on the interest rate
differential. Results are shown in Panel A of the Table 3. An estimated
17coefficient of INTDIF has a wrong sign but insignificantly different from
zero.This conclusion is valid with or without the constant term.The
result is also robust with respect to a sample split.Thus, uncovered
interest parity combined with rational expectations would not explain the
exchange rate movement. However, the predicted change in the exchange rate
overnight due to the interest rate differential would be very small, so that
it would not be depicted in the regression.
Insert Table 3 about here
An alternative link between the interest rate and the exchange rate is
the following channel.If the monetary policy is going to change, the
interest rate is most likely to pick up first. In other words, the change
in the interest rate differential represents the news to the financial
market. Therefore, if this is a major source, the change in the interest
rate differential would be significant in the exchange rate equation. The
portfolio balance approach would predict that an increase in the U.S.
interest rate attracts the foreign investment into the U.S., thus causes the
dollar appreciation (yen depreciation). Therefore, according to theory, the
coefficient of INTDIF(t+l)-JNTDIF(t) on the should be negative.The
regression results are shown in panel B of Table 3.The estimated
coefficients in all equations are insignificant, with or without the
constant term, and whether a full or a split sample is considered.
Therefore, the explanatory power of the interest rate on the exchange rate
changes is very weak. However, the failure of ditecting any influence from
the interest rate to the exchange rate may not be surprising, considering
the fact that the exchange rate was much more volatile than the interest
18rate differentials, as depicted in Figure 3b.
In sum, only a fraction of the exchange rate volatility is explained by
the interest rate differential or its changes.This negative result
justifies our news analysis approach in preceding sections, in that the
exchange rate responded primarily to political decisions and actions during
the two year period.
9. Was Yen Depreciation a Policy Objective?
The conventional wisdom is that Takahashi's policy depreciated the yen
and the depreciation helped export. See Nanto and Takagi (1985. p.371) and
Nakamura (1983, ch. 9).The view is correct to the extent that Takahashi
decided to go off gold and allowed a hard landing in December 1931.
However, it would be misleading to say that Japan pursued a deliberate
depreciation policy to help an export drive in 1932.
Our close examination of the exchange rate movements reveals that the
yen depreciation ! se was not a policy objective. After the hard landing,
the yen depreciated further. Our analysis shows that military aggressions
and foreign criticisms against them are resposible for a substantial part of
the yen depreciation of the 1931-32 period.The financial market was
sensitive to the political risk in holding the yen-denominated asset. The
market might have foreseen trade sanctions, an embargo or a blockade against
Japan, although actual problems as such did not materialize until years
later.In the meantime, the Japanese export soared and the balance of
payments started to improve in 1932.
We dismissed the (changes of) interest rate differential as a major
source of changes of the exchange rate. However, one might counter to our
position saying that fiscal and monetary policies were conducted, though not
19evident in the interest rate, so that the exchange rate could be influenced.
It is well-known that Finance Minister Takahashi conducted a debt-financed
fiscal expansion. In fact, the (central) government expenditures increased
by 32.5 percent and by 15.6 percent in Fiscal Years 1932 and 1933,
respectively. However, money supply (Ml) increased only 6.9 percent and 4.8
percent in 1932 and 1933, respectively.It is granted that fiscal policies
contributed to the early recovery of the Japanese economy. However, it is
quite questionable that those policies were conducted to prompt yen
depreciationwhich in turn helped export and output.
If the yen depreciation was designed to promote export, it would have
been promoted so by the government and the business. On the contrary, the
Japanese business leaders were asking the government to stop the yen
depreciation.The Chamber of Commerce in Osaka asked the government to
stabilize (i.e., prevent depreciation of) the yen as early as January, 1932.
The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce followed the suit in February. However, the
opinions were mixed in the first half of 1932. After the yen dropped below
$25/100 yen in the summer of 1932, the public opinion became solid in asking
the government to stop the depreciation.
Although Finance Minister Takahashi had stuck to a position that he
would let the market determine the level and there would be nothing the
government could do to prevent yen depreciation, ,thegovernment gradually
shifted its position. In July 1932, the Act of Preventing Capital Flight
was introduced, although it soon became clear that loopholes were so large
that the Act did not stop capital movement effectively. (See Bank of Japan
(1985, pp.84-89).) Facing a further depreciation in the second half of
1932, the government introduced a stricter law. The Foreign Exchange Control
Lawwasintroduced to the Parliament on February 14, 1933, passed the
20Parliament on March 17, and became effective on May 1, 1933. This law was
NantoandTakagi(1985), citing Nakamura (1983), gave the
interpretation that the exchange rate control was introduced to limit import
and to improve balance of payments, and preceded the United States, England
and Germany. On the contrary, the law of 1933 was intended to limit capital
export, thus preventing further depreciation of the yen. Exchange controls
at least at the time of introduction were not aimed at limiting import or
promoting export.
10. Concluding Remarks
In the beginning of our sample period, the international financial
market were well organized and free from regulations.Exchange rate
dynamicsin1931-32, without capital controls, hadmostofthe
characteristics common to that in late 1970s and the 1980s. The exchange
rate changes came in waves, and they corresponded to many news relevant to
the value of currencies. This observation is supported by a general success
of our "news analysis." Major news, such as decisions to go off gold (which
happend in 1931 in Japan, and in 1933 in the U.S.), caused the exchange rate
flucutuations immediatly in the home market. (However, there were a few
instances that the correspondence between relevant news and a large exchange
rate movement broke down.) As capital controls were introduced in Japan (in
the second half of 1932) and the United States (in 1933), capital movements
with speculative motives were significantly curtailed.
In sum, reasons for the yen depreciation from December 1931 to November
1932 can be summarized as follows. The yen depreciated by about 30 percent
($50 to $35 per 100 yen) in three weeks following (the anticipationand
reality of) the yen going off gold in December 1931 (Regime I).This was a
21clear-cut hard-landing from the overvalued "old parity." Most depreciation
took place in the Tokyo market just before and after the announcement of
gold embargo. During the year of 1932, the yen lost another 40 percent ($35
to $20 per 100 yen) of its value in several waves of depreciations separated
by calm periods (Regimes Q-I through Q-V).These depreciation waves
correspondintiming to various episodes ofJapanese imperialism
aggressions. During the year of 1932, sources of depreciation and volatility
gradually shifted from the Tokyo market to markets abroad.This is an
evidence that foreign investors and speculators became more sensitive to the
political risk of holding the yen as Japan became criticized by the
international diplomatic circles.Clearly this depreciation wasnot
engineered for export drive by the Japanese government's policy, but rather
a byproduct of its military adventures.
The the dollar/yen exchange rate moved from $20 to $30 per 100 yen in
1933. However, this was not the yen appreciation, but the dollar deprecia-
don.The main news which affected the exchange rate originated in the
United States.The effects of worsening of the Great Depression and the
decision to go off gold by the United States dominated the market.
The end of gold standard and political events mainly drove the exchange




/1/. Japan joined the gold standard in 1897 after receiving the 311 million
yen (38 million British Pounds) indemnity from China as a result of the
Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. The established parity implied approximately
2 yen to the dollar. Japan, along with European countries, suspended the
gold standard during the First World War.Sweden, after astrong
deflationary policy, returned to the gold standard at the old parity in the
beginning of the 192Os. British sterling returned to the gold standard in
1925, despite the advice of John M. Keynes against it.In 1926. France
joined the gold standard, but at a fraction of the pre World War I parity
due to the severe inflation after the war.
Although many European countries resumed the gold standard system in
the 1920s, Japan did not formally return to the gold standard until January
1930.However, the domestic policies of l920s were conducted in order to
keep the exchange rate near the old parity, that is, approximately 2
yen/dollar or 10 yen/L. At the time, it was believed that returning to the
gold standard would be stimulating to the sagging economy. However, the yen
was overvalued, and the demand from United States was declining due to the
weak economy and protectionism. Cold reserve drained and the Japanese
economy was in a recession. This prompted the policy change under the new
cabinet.
/2/ The Japanese gold reserve was declining quickly in 1931. Britain
already left the gold standard in September.The market was
expecting Japan to follow the suit after the Britain's decision.
However, it took more than two months and cabinet change for Japan to
Footnotes page -1-suspend its gold export.
Finance Minister Jun-nosuke Inouye in the Wakatsuki cabinet
believed in the gold standard, for the stability of foreign trades,
and repeatedly denied the rumor of suspension of gold embargo.On
December 11,1931, Prime Minister Wakatsuki and his cabinet members
resigned.In an interview after the resignation is submitted,
Finance Minister Inouye said, "It has been my belief that gold export
should not be suspended.Considering current economic conditions, I
do not recognize any reason for the suspension.Therefore,I will
not suspend gold export so long as this cabinet lasts.The issue of
gold should be considered by the next cabinet." (Chugai Shogyo
Shinpo, December 12, 1931; authors' translation.)
The dramatic mistake of sticking to the fixed exchange rate when
economic conditions were changed was going to be repeated some forty
years later in Japan.
The new government led by Prime Minister Inugai was formed on
December 13,1931.The new Finance Minister, Korekiyo Takahashi
immediately suspended the export of gold, and the convertibility of
yen. The Ministry Directive No. 36, issued and effective onDecember
13, stated that "(i) Export of gold coins and bars is subject to
approval of the Finance Minister; (ii) Violaters to (i) shall be
imprisoned for a period not exceeding three months or shall be
subject to a penalty not exceeding 100 yen; (iii) If a person sells
gold bars, or if a person collects, melts, or defaces gold coins to
be resold, then the person is subject to the same penalty as
described in (ii)." For the basis of the directive, Finance Minister
Footnotes page -2-Takahashi explained that "the economy and the fiscal budget have
recently choked since the gold export (standard) is resumed.The
government revenue has declined sharply, causing a massive budget
imbalance; the industries has been stalling without any sign of
recovery; the species has flowed out; the business community has been
suffering tremendously; the interest rate has increased, causing a
monetary crunch.The present course of the situation is not
bearable. It is unavoidable to put the suspension of gold export as
a pillar of new policy.This is the reason to announce the order of
gold export suspension as the first action of the new government."
(Chugai Shogyo Shinpo, December 13, extra, special edition, authors'
translation.) During the days immediately after this order, Finance
Minister repeatedly pointed out that the yen was overvalued and the
depreciation would be good for the Japanese industry, and that it
would be the best to let the market determine the exchange rate.
/3/ This period includes the suspension of gold export on December
13,1931, experienced the 60 percent change (depreciation) from
December 1,1931 ($50/loOyen) to November 30,1932 ($20/lOOyen).
This is all-time record for the most volatility for one year period,
only rivaled with the period of rapid yen appreciation which includes
the episode of the Group of Five, Plaza agreement on September 22,
1985.The yen/dollar rate changed slightly more than 60 percents,
from May 25, 1985 ($l/251 yen) to May 24, 1986 ($1/l55 yen).Note
that the calculation of both periods is based on the value of dollar
against yen (the IMF method).
There was no yen/$ exchange rate market during the Second World
Footnotes page -3-War.Hence, the 84-fold change in nine years, from the pre-WW II
($23.4/lOOyen) to the post-WW II level ($1/36Oyen, set in 1949), was
an exception for the volatility record.
/4/Finance Minister Takahashi is credited for the Keynesian-type
monetary and fiscal policies in the early 1930s. (See for details,
Nakamura (1983, ch.9), Shima (1983) and Yamamura (1972).) Government
expenditures were increased and financed by bonds which were
monetized by the Bank of Japan.The interest rates were lowered in
1932 and 1933.In literature on the Japanese economic history,
Finance Minister Takahashi is often nicknamed as a Keynes of Japan
(for example, in Nanto and Takagi (1985)).It is also emphasized
that his policies were executed before Keynes' General Theory was
written, and even before the New Deal was announced in the United
States.
/5/The daily exchange rate is expressed in the T.T. selling rate
(i.e., the rate for wire transfer). However, the quotes in Japan are
expressed as the rate that banks are willing to sell the U.S.
dollars bound for the New York, while the quotes in New York are
expressed as the rate that banks are willing to sell the Japanese
yen bound for Tokyo.Thus, the bid-ask spread has to be adjusted
beforethe statistical summary is calculated. The following
information is available for making inference on the size of bid-ask
spread during the period in question.
First, for selected days, the newspaper also reports the ask
rate in the Tokyo market.When the exchange rate experiences a very
rapid change, such as one after the gold embargo, the bid-ask spread
Footnotes page -4-was as much as $1 (when the level was $40/lOOyen, that is 2.5%).
However, most of the time, the spread was between $.50 (i.e., 1.67%)
and $.25 when the rate is volatile, and it was between $.25 (i.e.,
0.83% at $30/l00yen) and $.125 (i.e., 0.42% at $30/lOOyen) when the
rate is calm.Second, the bid-ask spread for the pound/yen rate in
the London market is available daily from December 1933 on. It
suggests that the spread is mostly between 0.7 and 0.9 ¼, and
occasionaly up to 1.4%.Third, if during each quiet period there is
no particular bias in depreciation and appreciation news falling in
the Tokyo and N.Y., then the per-day average change should be near
zero in each market in each quiet (Q) regime after the bid-ask spread
is adjusted.
These observations make us confident that the bid-ask spread can
be inferred as notes in Table 2.It is not essential to precisely
estimate the day-by-day bid-ask spread for our purpose.It suffices
to estimate the average bid-ask spread for the regime. Moreover, our
volatility measure, the standard error of the exchange rate change in
a market, is independent from the estimate of the bid-ask spread,
given that the bid-ask spread is taken to be a unknown constant.
/6/ A pattern of alternating tremulous and tranquil periods is common
to the experiences in the post Smithsonian period. It is one of the
"regularities" found by Mussa (1979).See, for example, waves
identified by Ito (1987) for the period after the Group of Five,
Plaza Agreement of 1985.
/7/For the beginning and ending of some regims, dating other than
one adopted in this paper could be conceivable. For example, the end
Footnotes page -5-of the second regime could be March 8 instead of February 26, 1932.
However, dating is not crucial to so long as the alternatives are
reasonably close each other.
/8/Bank of Japan (1985; p.65) lists another reason fore theyen
depreciation of this period: Seiyuukai, the majority party, advocated a
further yen depreciation, and the advocated policy caused a speculative
selling of yen outside Japan. This explanation is consistent with the fact
that most of yen appreciation took place in the New York market. However,
there is a difficulty with this explanation. The Japanese government at the
time was going to impose the Act of preventing capital flight in order to
stop yen depreciation caused by speculation. Policies of advocating the
depreciation and of preventing capital flight are conflicting in their
effects.
Moreover, the above-mentioned explanation implies the delayed reaction
of the exchange rate to the news. If Yen moves in the New York market
reacting to Japan-oriented news, it implies either that it took time to
digest news or that the Japanese traders could not foresee how American
traders would react to the news. Note that, in the l980s, even if traders
of different nationalities are heterogeneous, a reaction to the news is
immediate since all traders can, and do, participate in any market in the
world via telephone. The communication technology available in the 1930s
did not allow the institutions in New York to trade in real time in Tokyo.
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Entire (2-yr) period summary: 12/11/31 -11/21/33unit $/lOOyen
Total change =NYDY(l1/21/33)
-NYDY(12/11/31) -18.62
PERIOD MARKET 24-HR. CHANCE
12/11/31 -11/21/33 TOKYO NYORK NYORK24
per day average change-0.123 0.091 -0.032
per day std. deviation 0.529 0.461 0.495
number of observation 419 412 560
accumulated change -51.43 37.49 -18.14
SAMPLE SPLIT
12/11/31 -11/29/32 TOKYO NYORK NYORK24
per day average change -0.150 0.035 -0.107
per day std. deviation 0.685 0.544 0.626
number of observation 228 226 279
accumulated change -34.1125 8.015 -29.96
11/30/32 -11/21/33 TOKYO NYORX NYORK24
per day average change -0.091 0.158 0.042
per day std. deviation 0.229 0.323 0.297
number of observation 191 186 281
accumulated change -17.3173 29.4735 11.82
Note: Since there are missing observations,the number of
observations do not necessarily match the number of business days.
When the changes are measured, one missing observation in a market
will cause two missing observations in "changes."
Tables page --1--TABLE 2
Regime Dates TOKYO NYORK NYORK24
12/11/31
-12/30/31[-14.28]
per day average change -1.658 0.718 -0.925
per day std. deviation 1.66 1.23 1.75
number of observation 15 16 15
accumulated change -24.875 11.495 -13.880
QI 12/31/31 -2/16/32[-0.05]
per day average change -0.30 0.29 0.002
per day std. deviation 0.60 0.49 0.72
number of observation 29 28 34
accumulated change -8.675 8.235 0.08
II 2/17/32 -2/26/32[-3.65]
Per day average change 0.16 -0.70 -0.514
per day std. deviation 0.28 0.45 0.38
number of observation 7 7 7
accumulated change 1.0925 -4.8675 -3.60
Q-II 2/27/32 -6/14/32[-0.3]
per day average change -0.000 -0.002 -0.005
per day std. deviation 0.35 0.44 0.36
number of observation 73 72 89
accumulated change -0.0025 -0.1475 -0.43
III 6/15/32 -6/27/32[-4.44]
per day average change -0.24 -0.24 -0.404
per day std. deviation 0.44 0.39 0.70
number of observation 9 9 11
accumulated change -1.24 -3.05 -4.44
Q-III 6/28/32 -8/4/32[-0.19]
per day average change 0.16 -0.16 -0.006
per day std. deviation 0.15 0.16 0.25
number of observation 26 26 33
accumulated change 4.235 4.245 -0.19
IV8/5/32 -8/19/32[-3.87]
per day average change -0.03 -0.22 -0.30
per day std. deviation 0.29 0.23 0.41
number of observation 12 12 13
accumulated change -0.3875 -2.6125 -3.87
Q-IV 8/20/32 -10/25/32[-0.87]
per day average change -0.03 0.06 0.01
per day std. deviation 0.32 0.36 0.41
number of observation 39 38 51
accumulated change -0.9975 2.2575 0.55
Tables page -- 2--Table 2 continued
V 10/26/32 -11/29/32[-3.56)
per day average change -0.01 -0.11 -0.16
per day std. deviation 0.33 0.28 0.39
number of observation 18 18 26
accumulated change -0.2625 -2.05 -4.18
Q-V 11/30/32 -4/18/33[1.44]
per day average change 0.004 0.01 0.02
per day std. deviation 0.33 0.28 0.39
number of observation 63 61 105
accumulated change 0.2625 0.721 1.16
VIR 4/19/33 -4/25/33[3.12]
per day average change 0.26 0.33 0.52
per day std. deviation 0.39 0.74 0.38
number of observation 4 4 6
accumulated change 1.055 1.315 3.12
Q-VI 4/26/33 -6/2/33 [0.06]
per day average change -0.20 0.20 0.002
per day std. deviation 0.19 0.20 0.24
number of observation 20 20 33
accumulated change -4.06 3.94 0.06
VIIR 6/3/33 -7/18/33[5.57]
per day average change -0.14 0.32 0.14
per day std. deviation 0.21 0.32 0.36
number of observation 34 34 39
accumulated change -4.785 10.985 5.57
VIII 7/19/33 -8/1/33 [-3.00]
per day average change -0.39 -0.02 -0.27
per day std. deviation 0.42 0.51 0.52
number of observation 7 7 12
accumulated change -2.71 -0.16 -3.25
Q-VIII 8/2/33 -10/21/33[-0.19]
per day average change -0.04 0.10 0.015
per day std. deviation 0.19 0.27 0.26
number of observation 45 43 64
accumulated change -1.9675 4.3675 0.93
IX10/21/33 -11/21/33[4.12]
per day average change -0.28 0.48 0.165
per day std. deviation 0.15 0.40 0.43
number of observation 18 17 22
accumulated change -5.115 8.305 3.63
Tables page -- 3--Table 2 continued
Notes to Table 2
1. A number in [] isa total change for the regime.
2.The bid-ask spread is assumed as follows:(i) $0501100 yen from
December 11, 1931 to December 30, 1932; (ii) $0.20/lOU yen from December 31,
1931 to November 29, 1932; (iii) $0.15/lOO yen from November 30, 1932 to
April 18, 1933; (iv) $0.20/lOO yen from April 19, to November 21, 1933. For
the basis of this assumption, see footnote 5.
3. Since there are missing observations, the number of observations do not
necessarily match the number of business days.When the changes are
measured, one missing observation in a market will cause two missing
observations in "changes."
Tables page -- 4--Table 3
LHS: Daily (24-hour) % Change in the exchange rate,
l00*(NYDY(t+l)-NYDY(t))/NYDY(t)
a. Uncovered Interest Parity
Sample Constant INTDIF(t) D.W. R bar sq.
12/11/31 0.0196 -0.149 1.92 0.001
-11/19/33(0.189) (-1.212)
12/11/31 -0.132 1.92 0.003
-11/19/33 (-1.579)
12/11/31 -0.615 0.333 1.96 0.000
-11/29/32(-1.913) (1.001)
12/11/31 -0.260 1.93 -0.011
-11/29/32 (-2.129)
11/30/32 0.173 -0.004 1.97 -0.004
-11/20/33 (2.004) (-0.034)
11/30/32 0.115 1.94 -0.017
-11/20/33 (1.049)
b. Contemporary Interest Rate News
Sample Constant INTDIF(t)-INTDIF(t-l) D.W. R bar sq.
12/11/31 -0.0773 0.494 1.98 -0.001
-11/21/33 (-1.093) (0.817)
12/11/31 0.494 1.98 -0.001
-11/21/33 (0.816)
12/11/31 -0.325 0.746 2.05 -0.003
-11/29/32(-2.761) (0.495)
12/11/31 0.757 1.99 -0.030
-11/29/32 (0.496)
11/30/32 0.171 0.415 1.99 -0.001
-11/20/33 (2.266) (0.800)
11/30/32 0.418 1.94 -0.019
-11/20/33 (0.800)
Note: The number inside ()isthe t-statistics,
Tables page -- 5--FIGURE 1
Theexchange rate, l874-19,1: $/lOOyen
Source: I.Yarnazawa and Y. Yamamoto, Trade International
Balance fPayments,Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics,
vol. 14, Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha, p.64.
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